| 基于博弈理论的地方政府招商引资政策绩效分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 田秀华,焦勇.基于博弈理论的地方政府招商引资政策绩效分析[J].铜陵财经专科学校学报,2012(5):34-37. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 田秀华 焦勇 |
| |
| 作者单位： | [1]安徽财经大学,安徽蚌埠233041 [2]新疆农业大学,新疆乌鲁木齐830052 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 2011年度安徽省高校人文社科重点研究基地安徽财经大学经济发展研究中心招标项目《皖北地区招商引资政策绩效研究》（编号：2011sk739）研究成果 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 地方经济的发展在很大程度上依赖于投资商的投资。运用博弈理论,分析地方政府招商引资政策绩效,合理解释地方政府招商引资的政策选择和投资商投资的策略选择,将有助于提升投资数量和质量水平。在多期博弈过程中,随着博弈的期数增加,投资商信息越充分,信息溢价越大,地方政府越易出台强政策,投资商的投资水平随之增加。
|
| 关 键 词： | 招商引资 政策绩效 博弈理论 |
Analysis on the Performance of Local Government Attracting Investment Policies Based on Game Theory |
| |
| Authors: | Tian Xiu-hua Jiao Yong |
| |
| Institution: | 1.Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Benbu Anhui 233041,China;2.Xinjiang Agricultural University,Urumuqi Xinjiang 830052,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The development of local economy depends heavily on investors＇ investment.In this paper,using game theory,we analyze the performance of local governments attracting investment policies,and explain policy choices of local governments attracting investment and strategic selection of investors＇ investment.It will help to improve the investment quantity and quality level.In the process of multi-period game,when the number of game period increasing,the information that investors have will be more,the information premium will be greater,and local government will be easier to adopt strong policies. |
| |
| Keywords: | attract investment policy performance game theory |
| 本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录！ |
|
