Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases

We present an election model employing candidates with policy preferences, and show how re-election pressure induces candidates to keep their campaign promises in finitely repeated competitions. The game consists of two periods, each of which comprises an election followed by the winner’s policy implementation. Following the first election, the incumbent may signal his dishonesty by implementing a policy different from his campaign promise. If the citizens care about political honesty, this choice reduces the incumbent’s probability of re-election. An equilibrium is derived which demonstrates that even with term limits, an elected candidate’s deviation from his campaign promise is controlled by the citizens’ monitoring of his performance. Strong public response to the dishonesty of politicians thus serves as a commitment device. The author is grateful to anonymous referees and to the editor of the journal for many valuable comments and suggestions. The author also thanks Masaki Aoyagi, Motonari Kurasawa, Yukihiro Nishimura, Shigehiro Serizawa, Takashi Ui, and participants in the seminars held by the Institute of Statistical Research, Meikai University, Osaka University, University of California, Irvine, and Yokohama National University for their insightful comments.