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To intervene,or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises
Institution:1. University of Bayreuth, Department of Law and Economics, Chair of International Economics and Finance, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany;2. University of Trier, Chair of Monetary Economics, 54286 Trier, Germany;1. School of Economics and Trade, Kyungpook National University, Daehak Ro 80, Bukgu, Daegu 702-701, South Korea;2. Department of Agricultural & Resouce Economics, University of Tennessee, 2621 Morgan Circle, Knoxville, TN 37996-4518, USA;3. Department of Statistics, College of Natural Science, Kyungpook National University, Daehak Ro 80, Bukgu, Daegu 702-701, South Korea;1. Department of Finance, National Taiwan University, Taiwan;2. Department of Digital Financial Technology, Chang Gung University, Taiwan;3. Department of International Business, National Taiwan University, Taiwan;4. Department of Finance, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan
Abstract:In case of speculative attacks, the central banks' decisions to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for the economic costs of currency crises. The central bank can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention, which in turn can be successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, an adequate analysis of the costs of currency crises has to take into account three different types of currency crises: (i) an immediate depreciation without any central bank interventions, (ii) a successful defense, and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate. We find that the decision of the central bank to intervene or to remain passive is risky. If the central bank intervenes and succeeds she can achieve the best growth performance on average. However, if the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the subsequent output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining from an intervention yields a scenario with a relatively small drop in output. Giving in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus be a suitable option for a risk-averse central bank.
Keywords:Currency crises  Monetary policy  E42  E58  F31
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