| 基于委托—代理模型的食品安全规制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王孝莹,张艳艳.基于委托—代理模型的食品安全规制研究[J].山东财政学院学报,2013(3):85-89. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王孝莹 张艳艳 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东财经大学经济学院,山东济南,250014 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目"转轨经济条件下网络型产业竞争政策研究"，中国博士后科学基金"行政垄断行业改革与发展研究" |
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| 摘 要： | 我国食品安全问题频发的主要原因是信息不对称,文章从委托—代理理论出发,分析在食品安全规制中委托人(规制者)和代理人(被规制者)的行动,并分析他们采取行动时的影响因素,得出规制者可以通过规制满意度、努力报酬等设立食品安全规制激励机制,使双方的效用最大化,以更好的解决食品安全问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 委托—代理 激励性规制 食品安全 |
A Research on Food Safety Regulation Based on the Principal-agent Model |
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| WANG Xiao-ying
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ZHANG Yan-yan.A Research on Food Safety Regulation Based on the Principal-agent Model[J].Journal of Shandong Finance Institute,2013(3):85-89. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xiao-ying ZHANG Yan-yan |
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| Institution: | ( chool of Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China) |
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| Abstract: | The main reason for the frequent occurrence of food safety problems in our country lies in asymmetric information. This paper, based on the principal-agent theory, analyses the behaviors of regulators （government） and the regulation （food enterprise） and the factors influencing them in food safety regulation. It is concluded that lators can set up food safety regulation incentive mechanism by satisfaction regulation and remuneration thus achieving utility maximization of both parties so as to better solve the food safety problems. |
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| Keywords: | food safety principal-agent incentive regulation self regulation regulation |
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