Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent,two-good economies |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Antonio?NicolóEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Padua, via del Santo 33, 35123 Padova, Italy |
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Abstract: | In exchange economies where agents have private information about their preferences, strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions are in general not efficient. We provide a restricted domain, namely the set of preferences representable by Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms which are strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational. In two-agent, two-good economies we are able to provide an even stronger result. We characterize the class of efficient and individually rational social choice functions, which are fully implementable in truthful strategies.Received: 28 April 2003, Accepted: 23 June 2003, JEL Classification:
D51, D71The author thanks Matthew Jackson, Jordi Massó and James Schummer for fruitful discussions, William Thomson for many valuable comments on an earlier version. A particular thank to Salvador Barberá for his fundamental help. |
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Keywords: | Strategy-proof exchange economies social choice |
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