International negotiations on carbon dioxide reductions: A dynamic game model |
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Authors: | Boleslaw Tolwinski Wade E. Martin |
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Affiliation: | (1) ORE for Mineral Industries, 518 Parkview Ct., 80403 Golden, Colorado;(2) Environmental Policy Center, Mineral Economics Department, Colorado School of Mines, 80401 Golden, Colorado |
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Abstract: | Is there is a warming trend in the earth's climate caused by an increase in concentrations of greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere, it may be sensible to try to slow down that process by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and, in particular, the emissions of carbon dioxide produced by the energy sector of world economies. For a number of reasons, a consensus on such reductions is difficult to reach. In this article, we model the problem as a dynamic game with national governments, or coalitions of such governments, as players. Clearly, the negotiations on worldwide reductions in CO2 emissions can succeed only if there exists a cooperative solution superior to the noncooperative one. According to our model, the existence of a collectively preferable cooperative solution depends on the degree of concern among national governments about negative impacts of increased CO2 concentrations. In addition to this unsurprising conclusion, the model can provide insights as to whose concerns will count most for the success of the negotiations and who will have to be induced by side payments to participate. |
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Keywords: | dynamic game Nash equilibrium Stackelberg solution cooperative solution international negotiations global warming |
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