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景区门票价格偏高的一个博弈论解释
引用本文:宋子千.景区门票价格偏高的一个博弈论解释[J].桂林旅游高等专科学校学报,2004,15(1):31-34.
作者姓名:宋子千
作者单位:中国社会科学院,研究生院,北京,100102
摘    要:指出景区产品是差别垄断产品,通过引入博弈论的思想,论证差别垄断这一特性可能使得景区自动趋向完全垄断价格,造成社会福利损失。这一模型可以解释我国门票价格偏高以及部分景点还在酝酿提价的现象。

关 键 词:风景区  门票价格  博弈论  景区产品  垄断竞争分析  差别产品  中国  社会福利
文章编号:1008-6080(2004)01-0031-04

An Explanation for High Entrance Fee of Scenic Spot Based on Games Theory
SONG Zi-qian.An Explanation for High Entrance Fee of Scenic Spot Based on Games Theory[J].Journal of Guilin Institute of Tourism,2004,15(1):31-34.
Authors:SONG Zi-qian
Abstract:This paper points out product of scenic spot is differential-monopolistic product, and based on games theory, proves that owing to the character of differentiation-monopoly scenic spot may tend to make an absolute monopoly price by its self-motion, and thus lead to the loss of social welfare. The above model can give an explanation for the phenomenon that entrance fee of most scenic spots in China is high but many scenic spots still try to increase the price.
Keywords:differential-monopolistic product  monopolistic competition  games theory  entrance fee of scenic spot
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