终极产权、股权制衡与投资

本文以我国上市公司2002年-2007年的数据为样本，实证检验了股权制衡在企业投资决策方面的治理效应。结果发现，并没有证据表明制衡的股权结构在抑制企业非效率投资行为方面起到了监督大股东的作用，反而有更多的证据表明股权制衡加剧了企业过度投资和投资不足问题，并且在非国有控股企业中这种现象更为严重。

Ownership Structure, Power Balance with Shareholder Structure and Investment

The paper makes an empirical analysis to prove the governance effect of power balance with shareholder structure on capital investment decision by using the data from 2002 to 2007 of China＇ s listed companies. It is found that no evidence shows power balance with shareholder structure will mitigate the inefficient investment. On the contrary, more evidence shows that power balance with shareholder structure has induced overinvestment and underinvestment, particularly in the non - state controlled listed companies.