The influence of disclosure policy on analyst behavior: The case of segment data

More transparent disclosure reduces the effort required to process reported information. The adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, increased the transparency of segment information reported by diversified firms. Using a long sample window (1988–2007) and a difference-in-difference design, this paper examines the association between corporate diversification and analysts' efforts—as reflected in analysts' idiosyncratic information precision and analyst consensus—across the old SFAS No. 14 and the new SFAS No. 131 segment reporting regime. Results indicate that SFAS No. 131 has improved segment reporting such that analysts need to invest relatively less effort generating idiosyncratic information when issuing forecasts for diversified firms. Given that analysts' information gathering efforts are costly, these findings are of interest to policy makers when assessing whether the intended reporting objectives of SFAS No. 131 are being met in a cost effective manner.