发审委员隐性问责机制研究 :兼论对 IPO 注册制的启示

IPO核准制中发审委员是否会因其审核的质量而被证监会问责?文章运用2006-2012年中国 A 股市场审核发行的新股数据发现 ,在发审会的7名发审委员中,未达到最大可能任期就被撤换的人数与公司上市当年发生业绩变脸的概率之间显著正相关.这表明证监会知晓发审委员的审核质量,但并没有对审核质量不佳的"问题"发审委员进行公开问责,而是代之以隐性问责 ,即在发审委换届时将其撤换.这一发现支持了 IPO注册制中将审核权下放到交易所从而提升监管独立性的举措 ,也为注册制中聆讯委员会制度的建设提供了启示.文章认为,披露更多的审核信息 ,增加对审核人员的奖惩力度,是提升 IPO审核有效性的途径.

A Study of Implicit Accountability of IEC Members :On the Enlightenment of Registration-based IPO System

Whether the unqualified IEC members will account to China Securities Reg-ulatory Commission (CSRS) for their review performance under IPO approval system ?By using the data of IPO firms from 2006 to 2012 in Chinese A-share market ,this paper shows that among seven IEC members ,there is a significantly positive relationship between the number of IEC members replaced by CSRS during their possible maximum term and the probability of performance diving in the year the company is listed .The results indicate that CSRC is aware of the IEC members' review performance but does not publicly punish IEC members owing to their bad performance ,and implicitly punish them instead ,namely CSRC replaces unqualified IEC members when IEC changes .These findings support the measure about the devolution of the authority of review to exchanges under registration-based IPO system and thereby the improvement of supervision independence ,and provide the enlightenment of the construction of hearing com mittee system under registration-based IPO system .It believes that more review information disclosure and the increase in the punishment of reviewers are the routes of improving the effectiveness of IPO review .