COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION |
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Authors: | Rupayan Pal |
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Affiliation: | Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India |
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Abstract: | Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct. |
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Keywords: | incentive scheme managerial delegation R&D semi‐collusion L10 L13 |
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