Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis |
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Authors: | Siegfried K Berninghaus Christian Korth Stefan Napel |
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Institution: | (1) School of Economics and Business Engineering, University of Karlsruhe, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany;(2) Grindelhof 85, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany;(3) Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper investigates agents who face a stylized pecuniary ‘game of life’ comprising the ultimatum game and the dictator
game. Utility may but need not be attached to equity and reciprocity, as formalized by Falk and Fischbacher (Games Econom Behav, 54(2): 293–315, 2006) but, critically, this social component of preferences cannot be conditioned on whether an ultimatum or a dictator game is
played. Evolutionary fitness of agents is determined solely by material success. Under these conditions, a strong preference
for reciprocity, but little interest in equity as such evolves. Possible exogenous constraints that link reciprocity and equity
concerns imply long-run levels of both which depend on the relative frequency of ultimatum vs. dictator interaction in agents’
multi-game environment.
Financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged. |
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Keywords: | Reciprocity Evolutionary stability Fairness |
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