Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy |
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Authors: | Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen,Lars Sø rgard |
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Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway b Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway c Norwegian Competition Authority, Norway |
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Abstract: | The article examines (i) why low-quality private labels are introduced in some product categories and not in others, (ii) how the existence of a low-quality private label affects the pricing of a competing national brand, and (iii) how consumers’ surplus and welfare are affected by private labels. We find that the potential for private label introduction may—in return for national brand exclusivity in that particular retail store (exclusive dealing)—lead to price concessions from the producer of the national brand. If the national brand producer decides not to offer an exclusivity contract, a private label is introduced. In this case, private label introduction may lead to higher retail prices on national brands, which can be detrimental to consumer welfare as well as total welfare. We argue that our results have important implications for the interpretation of empirical results and the public policy towards national brands |
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Keywords: | L12 L40 |
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