分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。

Distribution Commitments, Property Rights and Economic Efficiency

When local government distribution commitments are credible, owners of private enterprises benefit the most, while worker’s interests are ignored, but local governments have more incentive to fight corruption. In the early stages of reform and opening up, neutral government played a very important role in economic growth. But with the deepening of reform and opening up, incentive mechanisms in competition between local decentralized governments may play a more important role. When local government distribution commitments are not credible, owners of private enterprises will have less incentive to invest and produce, and losses to social welfare will be greater. Analysis shows that the structure of industry is closely related to the protection of property rights, so in order to upgrade the industrial structure, a good protection system of property rights is important. This paper tries to propose two approaches to solve social and economic problems: third-party regulation and decentralization (distributing power to investors and workers, so the two parties can gain credible bargaining power to economic rent), and also shows the defects of these two approaches.