Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting |
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Authors: | Martin J. Osborne Ariel Rubinstein |
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Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada;b School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel;c Department of Economics, Princeton University, USA |
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Abstract: | We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates. |
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Keywords: | Sampling equilibrium Bounded rationality Strategic voting |
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