Bank lending,misleading signals,and the latin american debt crisis

This article explores the microfoundations of bank and borrower behavior in the Latin American debt crisis. In the model developed, less developed countries attract loans by signaling their ability and willingness to pay. Some of the signals are “coercive” because they indicate that if income targets are not met, income will be redistributed in order to honor debt obligations. Implicit in such coercive signaling is the borrower's expectation that redistribution will not damage economic productivity. A coercive signal is misleading when feedback effects on social stability and work effort—and thus on the ability to pay—are underestimated or ignored; in this case, it inaccurately predicts repayment prospects. We estimate two equations: (1) private lending to Latin borrowers as a function of our specified signals, and (2) the probability of payments problem as a function of the same set of signals. The results support our borrowing model: coercive signals do enhance lending, and at least one of these signals is misleading.