THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION

In recent years, several empirical studies have attempted to investigate the key influences, or determinants, of the anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) decision-making process. As a consequence, several different empirical modelling approaches have been developed using alternative, and in some cases, competing theoretical frameworks. Each approach tests empirically aspects of the AD/CVD decision-making process for evidence of particular forms of pressure that contribute to protectionist outcomes. However, the results of these studies have been somewhat inconsistent and inconclusive, possibly because the analytical scope of these studies appears to be too narrow. Hence, the current article sets for itself the important objective of developing a more general framework for modelling contingent protection empirically. A taxonomy is introduced that suggests that the types of bias affecting AD/CVD decision-makers may be separated into three broad categories: political supply pressure, industry demand pressure, and regulatory process pressure. This approach is then used to analyse recent Australian anti-dumping outcomes. The empirical results generated from the Australian data, using the taxonomy, suggest that from the supply side, the Australian government appears to be biased against the provision of AD/CVD protection. On the other hand, the results suggest that a demand-side bias appears to be present. That is, the Australian AD/CVD process appears to be weighted towards a demand, rather than supply, orientation contrary to political economy suggestions that AD/CVD policy is used as a politically driven trade policy device.