首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

我国企业年金逆向选择和道德风险管理研究
引用本文:侯晓康,杨君岐,吕英慧. 我国企业年金逆向选择和道德风险管理研究[J]. 财务与金融, 2012, 0(5): 50-54
作者姓名:侯晓康  杨君岐  吕英慧
作者单位:1. 陕西科技大学
2. 中南财经政法大学,陕西西安,710021
摘    要:当前形势下我国人口老龄化问题日益凸显,基本养老保险制度面临着巨大的支付压力。企业年金在缓解基本养老保险给付方面起到了重大的补充作用,但是我国现行的企业年金在实际运营管理中存在很多问题。论文从委托代理角度分析企业年金各主体之间的逆向选择和道德风险问题,并提出几点相关政策建议,以完善我国企业年金制度,使其更好地为企业职工提供更安全更实惠的社会福利。

关 键 词:企业年金  逆向选择  道德风险

Research on Adverse Selection of Enterprise Annuity and Moral Hazard Management in China
HOU Xiao-kang , YANG Jun-qi , LV Ying-hui. Research on Adverse Selection of Enterprise Annuity and Moral Hazard Management in China[J]. Accounting and Finance, 2012, 0(5): 50-54
Authors:HOU Xiao-kang    YANG Jun-qi    LV Ying-hui
Affiliation:School of Management, Shanxi University of Science and Technology, Xi'an 710021 School of Public Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073
Abstract:Under current situation, the problem of aging of the population becomes increasingly prominent in China, the basic pension insurance system face great payment pressure. Enterprise annuity plays very important supplement role for the relief of basic pension insurance payment, however, the practical operation management of enterprise annuity in China exists a lot of problems. This paper analyzes the adverse selection and moral hazard problem among different bodies from the perspective of principle-agent, and provides several policy suggestions to perfect enterprise annuity system in China, and therefore provide safer and more affordable society benefit for enterprises' employees.
Keywords:Enterprise Annuity  Adverse Selection  Moral Hazard
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号