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从自我履约协议看股东权益保护
引用本文:吴颉,熊平. 从自我履约协议看股东权益保护[J]. 特区经济, 2007, 0(12): 117-118
作者姓名:吴颉  熊平
作者单位:西南财经大学,四川,成都,610041
摘    要:近年来的研究发现世界上大部分国家的企业股权并不分散而是相当集中的,公司治理的主要问题是大股东与小股东之间的代理问题。本文从自我履约协议的视角探讨了股东之间的利益冲突问题,提出利用可回售股份来建立重复博弈的机制,解决大股东侵害的问题。

关 键 词:代理  自我履约  可回售股份

Looking at shareholder rights protection from self following promise contract
Wu Xie,Xiong Ping. Looking at shareholder rights protection from self following promise contract[J]. Special Zone Economy, 2007, 0(12): 117-118
Authors:Wu Xie  Xiong Ping
Abstract:Recent research has documented the ownership of firms in many countries is not dispersed but concentrated,and the importance of corporate governance is agency problem between large shareholder and minority shareholders,This article inquires into the conflict of interests in respect of self-enforcing contracts,and suggests setting up repeated game with puttable shares to prevent expropriation.
Keywords:agency  self-enforcing  puttable shares
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