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零售商垄断势力、通道费与经济规制
引用本文:张赞,郁义鸿.零售商垄断势力、通道费与经济规制[J].财贸经济,2006(3):60-65.
作者姓名:张赞  郁义鸿
作者单位:复旦大学管理学院产业经济学系
摘    要:拥有买方垄断势力的零售商对生产商的纵向约束是近年来西方国家反垄断司法实践所关注的焦点之一,然而现有的文献对于零售商拥有买方垄断势力的情形很少涉及.现实中,随着零售业的变革,下游零售商很可能在产业链中成为主导企业,从而导致零售商要求生产商交纳"通道费"的现象十分普遍.本文基于SCP分析框架,对零售商垄断势力下的通道费及其福利效应进行分析,并对相应的政府规制提出建议.

关 键 词:买方垄断  通道费  经济规制
文章编号:1002-8102(2006)03-0060-06

Retailers' Monopsony, Slotting Allowance and Economic Regulation
ZHANG Zan,YU Yihong.Retailers'''' Monopsony, Slotting Allowance and Economic Regulation[J].Finance & Trade Economics,2006(3):60-65.
Authors:ZHANG Zan  YU Yihong
Abstract:Vertical constraint imposed on manufacturers by retailers who have monopsony power is one of the main focuses in antitrust law practices in western countries, but there is little attention on the situation of retailers who have monopsony power in existing literatures. With the reform of retailing industry, retailers are becoming the dominant firms in the industry chain. As a result, slotting allowance is a prevailing phenomenon now. Based on SCP-R framework, this paper analyzes the slotting allowance and its welfare effects, and suggests the corresponding policies of regulation.
Keywords:Monopsony  Slotting Allowance  Economic Regulation
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