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基于博弈论视角的新型农村合作医疗中供给诱导需求和供需合谋问题探析
引用本文:董立淳.基于博弈论视角的新型农村合作医疗中供给诱导需求和供需合谋问题探析[J].经济经纬,2009(2).
作者姓名:董立淳
作者单位:南开大学经济学院,天津,300071
摘    要:利用贝叶斯博弈模型分析在新型农村合作医疗制度中医疗机构和农民之间的博弈,分析引发医疗服务供给诱导需求的原因,以及由于道德风险引发的医疗机构和农民之间的合谋,并且提出建立第三方购买机制等若干建议,以控制医疗费用不合理地快速增长.

关 键 词:新型农村合作医疗  贝叶斯博弈  供给诱导需求  道德风险

A Probe into the Supply Inducing Demand and the Conspiracy of Supply and Demand in New Rural Cooperative Medical System from the Perspective of Game Theory
DONG Li-chun.A Probe into the Supply Inducing Demand and the Conspiracy of Supply and Demand in New Rural Cooperative Medical System from the Perspective of Game Theory[J].Economic Survey,2009(2).
Authors:DONG Li-chun
Institution:School of Economics;Nankai University;Tianjin 300071;China
Abstract:The author uses Bayesian game model to analyze the game between medical institutions and farmers in the new rural cooperative medical system,the reason for the supply of medical service inducing demand and the conspiracy of medical institutions and farmers caused by moral risks and suggests the construction of the third part purchasing mechanism to control the unreasonably quick increase in medical costs.
Keywords:new rural cooperative medical system  Bayesian game  supply inducing demand  moral risk  
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