Investment under Demand Uncertainty,Ex-Ante Pricing,and Oligopoly |
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Authors: | Driver Ciaran Goffinet Fabrice |
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Affiliation: | (1) Imperial College Management School, University of London, U.K. |
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Abstract: | This paper considers the capacity choice of duopolists who set price ex-ante under demand uncertainty with risk-neutrality. The duopolists compete for market shares on the basis of availability of supply, rather than by price competition. Collusive pricing coexists with Cournot–Nash capacity choice. A formal model is presented, where the market share of each firm may deviate from the certainty share due to rationing. With shares reflecting different costs, capacity utilisation for the lower cost firm is expected to be substantially lower. The implications for the price-cost margin and capacity formation are also explored. |
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Keywords: | Investment capacity, risk duopoly utilization risk price |
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