| 岗位竞争制与国有企业经理人激励博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 顾建强,王锐兰,崔新进.岗位竞争制与国有企业经理人激励博弈分析[J].价值工程,2005,24(3):82-83. |
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| 作者姓名： | 顾建强 王锐兰 崔新进 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京,210016 |
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| 摘 要： | 论文中分析研究了岗位竞争制,与国有企业经理人激励之间的关系。建立了岗位任命制和岗位竞争制的激励产出模型。通过比较与分析,得出了主要的结论:岗位竞争制的激励效果要优于岗位任命制。在文章最后提出一些建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 岗位竞争制 激励 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-4311(2005)03-0082-02 |
Competing Mechanism And Incentive Of Manager In State-Owned Enterprise |
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| Gu Jianqiang,Wang Ruilan,Cui Xinjin.Competing Mechanism And Incentive Of Manager In State-Owned Enterprise[J].Value Engineering,2005,24(3):82-83. |
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| Authors: | Gu Jianqiang Wang Ruilan Cui Xinjin |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the relationship of selecting mechanism and incentive of manager in state-owned enterprise, We analysis a model of appointing model ,then we give a new model of competing for post by competing with the appointing model. Finally we give out the main conclusion that competing mechanism is better than appointing mechanism and in the same time we give some suggestions. |
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| Keywords: | competing mechanism incentive game |
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