Market access in regulated and unregulated markets: The continuing cost of interstate motor carrier regulation

This study examines the effect of regulatory reform in the interstate trucking industry. In our model, carriers travel in round trips and choose to serve different markets corresponding to each leg of the trip. Some carriers have authority to haul freight subject to regulation while other carriers do not. Unlike previous studies, our model applies to decisions acrossmultiple legs. Using a bivariate probit, we find differences in the determinants of accessacross markets. Entry regulation has a significant influence only in markets dominated by regulated traffic, whereas location has a significant influence only in markets dominated by unregulated traffic.Name order was determined by a coin toss. Kenneth Boyer, Victoria Dailey, Gregory Duncan, Jo Anna Gray, Shane Greenstein, Edward H. Rastatter, and Joe A. Stone made a number of useful comments that improved the paper, and Marylynne Diggs made a number of editorial comments.