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合作博弈视角下慕课联盟利益分配机制设计
引用本文:赵佳莹,俞颂华.合作博弈视角下慕课联盟利益分配机制设计[J].科技和产业,2022,22(4):116-122.
作者姓名:赵佳莹  俞颂华
作者单位:宁波幼儿师范高等专科学校 阳明人文学院,浙江 宁波 315336
摘    要:合理的利益分配是激励慕课联盟平台和高校共同推动优质数字教育资源建设的重要保障。以宁波高校慕课联盟平台为例,首先运用Shapley值改进模型设计高校间在慕课数量和质量上的利益分配机制,其次考虑平台为“经济人”角色,将Shapley值改进模型融入平台与高校的委托代理模型中,设计平台对高校的奖金分配机制。研究发现该机制有利于激励高校共建优质数字教育资源,扩大慕课联盟的数量规模,提高平台效益。

关 键 词:利益分配  机制设计  委托代理理论  Shapley值

Designing the Benefit Distribution Mechanism of Catechism Consortium from the Perspective of Cooperative Game
Abstract:Reasonable benefit distribution is an important guarantee to motivate the catechism alliance platform and universities to jointly promote the construction of high-quality digital education resources. Taking Ningbo University Catechism Alliance Platform as an example, firstly, the Shapley value improvement model is applied to design the benefit distribution mechanism between universities in terms of the quantity and quality of catechism courses. Secondly, considering the platform as an "economist", the Shapley value improvement model is incorporated into the principal-agent model between the platform and universities, and the bonus distribution mechanism between the platform and universities is designed. It is found that this mechanism is conducive to motivating universities to build high-quality digital education resources, expanding the quantitative scale of the catechism alliance and improving the effectiveness of the platform.
Keywords:benefit distribution  mechanism design  principal-agent theory  Shapley value
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