累积投票制与投资者保护

 基于近年来频发的个股崩盘现象，本文运用2013-2018年上市公司的数据，对大股东减持前的业绩预告信息进行分析，探究业绩预告、大股东减持与股价崩盘风险之间的内在联系，并针对不同市场环境和股份性质进行实证检验。结果表明，上市公司倾向于在减持前公布积极业绩预告。其在一定程度上提高股价崩盘现象的发生率，在熊市和民营公司中作用更加明显，消极业绩预告影响不显著。本文的研究丰富了信息披露与股价反应的相关文献，对投资者和监管部门做出决策具有一定的启示意义。

CUMULATIVE VOTING AND THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION

Using a sample of listed firms in China, this paper analyzes the short term market reaction and long term economic impact of the adoption of the cumulative voting on corporate performance and corporate governance. With event study and difference in differences estimation methods, our results show that in the short term, the announcement of the cumulative voting system leads to 04% of the cumulative average abnormal returns during \-7,1\] days window period (about 11% annually). In the long run, the cumulative voting system significantly improves the performance of listed companies. The improvement of performance is largely due to the improved corporate governance. Specifically, we find that firms with cumulative voting written in articles are using cumulative voting more frequently during director elections, having more board meetings, with higher independence level of the board of directors, with better shareholding structure, and with higher educational level of management teams. Our results also show that cumulative voting will, in some extent, reduce the large shareholders' “tunneling” of listed companies.