审计市场中的信号显示机制:理论与实证分析

本文首先给出了审计师声誉与“质量溢价”的理论模型,然后利用上市公司披露的2000~2002年三年的年报审计费用共2520家样本进行了实证分析。在控制住客户规模、业务复杂程度以及审计风险之后,从三年的回归结果可以看出,审计师声誉越高,审计服务价格中的“质量溢价”也越高。国际“五大”合作所的审计服务价格显著高于国内“五大”所,而国内“五大”所的审计服务价格又显著高于国内其他所。这说明审计师声誉和审计服务价格作为审计质量的显示信号,得到了市场的认同,虽然审计市场具有“二手车”市场的特征,但是由于多期博弈的存在,部分消除了审计市场中的信息不对称现象。

The Signal in Audit Market: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

In this paper, a theoretical model about auditor reputation and premium of audit fees is firstly given. Then an empirical study is carried through 2520 observations of annual report audit fees disclosed by listed companies. The conclusion of this paper is that the value of auditor reputation reflects on “premium of audit fees”. Controlling client scale, complexity and audit risk, ceteris paribus, premium of audit fees earned by Chinese “Big 5” auditors is more than domestic others, premium of audit fees earned by international “Big 5” auditors is more than Chinese “Big 5” auditors. Our results indicate that auditor reputation and audit sevice price as the signal of audit quality is agreed by the market. Although audit market is earmarked as “second-hand motor”, multiple-period games attenuate information asymmetry of audit market partly.