Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games |
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Authors: | Gerhard Sorger |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Brünner Str. 72, A-1210 Vienna, AUSTRIA |
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Abstract: | Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.Received: November 1, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. |
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Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: C73 L13 Q20. |
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