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论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应
引用本文:王根蓓. 论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(3)
作者姓名:王根蓓
作者单位:上海财经大学,国际工商管理学院,上海,200433
摘    要:文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Coumot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题.文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求由线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响.

关 键 词:策略性采购联盟  联盟偏好  集体谈判力  互补性贸易  价格、销量与福利效应

Research on Price,Sales and Welfare effects of Collective Bargaining Power of Strategic Procurement-coalition
WANG Gen-bei. Research on Price,Sales and Welfare effects of Collective Bargaining Power of Strategic Procurement-coalition[J]. The Study of Finance and Economics, 2009, 35(3)
Authors:WANG Gen-bei
Affiliation:School of International Business;Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;Shanghai 200433;China
Abstract:Based on outsourcing services in manufacturing industry,the paper develops a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash bargaining model concerning on collective bargaining between strategic procurement-coalition of the host country and foreign monopolistic supplier.It discusses the issues about whether to establish the strategic procurement-coalition and how to conduct the collective bargaining power to reduce cost and guarantee supply.This paper shows that trade complementarity between the host country and foreign coun...
Keywords:strategic procurement-coalition  coalition preference  collective bargaining power  complementary trade  price effect  sales effect and welfare effect  
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