首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

国有企业经理控制权激励机制解析
引用本文:缪文卿.国有企业经理控制权激励机制解析[J].经济经纬,2007(3):85-87.
作者姓名:缪文卿
作者单位:山东大学,经济学院,山东,济南,250100
摘    要:国有企业经理掌握着一定的企业控制权,接受着替代性的控制权激励.但这种激励机制存在着理论弊端.我们必须建立一种新的激励机制,使国有企业经理能够获得与其人力资本产权相称的收益,从根本上解决国有企业经理激励问题.

关 键 词:国有企业  经理  控制权  激励机制  国有  企业经理  控制权激励  机制解  Incentive  Mechanism  激励问题  收益  资本产权  人力  理论  存在  激励机制  替代性  企业控制权
文章编号:1006-1096(2007)03-0085-03
收稿时间:2006-11-27
修稿时间:2006年11月27

Analysis of Incentive Mechanism for Control-Right of Managers in SOEs
MIAO Wen-qing.Analysis of Incentive Mechanism for Control-Right of Managers in SOEs[J].Economic Survey,2007(3):85-87.
Authors:MIAO Wen-qing
Institution:School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Abstract:SOEs' managers practically handle SOEs' control-right,receiving substitutive control-right incentive.However this kind of incentive mechanism has its drawbacks.A new incentive mechanism must be built in order that SOEs' managers can obtain the lucre which is proportional with their human capital property-right,and the predicament of managers' incentive in SOEs can be solved fundamentally.
Keywords:SOE  manager  control-right  incentive mechanism
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号