| 信息不对称条件下医生职业行为的激励与约束——基于北京市医生与患者的调查数据 |
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| 引用本文： | 张琪,王秀峰.信息不对称条件下医生职业行为的激励与约束——基于北京市医生与患者的调查数据[J].北京劳动保障职业学院学报,2009,3(3):13-16. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张琪 王秀峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 首都经济贸易大学,北京,100070 |
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| 摘 要： | 医生行为在很大程度上决定着患者的医疗消费状况。医患之间的信息不对称问题使医生处于信息优势地位，极易引发道德风险。医生行为扭曲的主要原因是信息不对称条件下医生存在诱导需求、患者自身对医生行为的约束作用不够以及医疗费用支付方式对医生行为约束不足。控制医生的诊疗行为，是从根本上建立医生声誉机制、建立医患长期的合作制度和建立有效的第三方激励与约束机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 医生职业行为 激励与约束 |
Stimulation and Binding for Doctors' Behavior under the Condition of Information Dissymmetry-Based on Investigation Data of Doctors and Patients in Beijing |
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| Zhang Qi,Wang Xiufeng.Stimulation and Binding for Doctors' Behavior under the Condition of Information Dissymmetry-Based on Investigation Data of Doctors and Patients in Beijing[J].Journal of Beijing Vocational College of Labour and Social Security,2009,3(3):13-16. |
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| Authors: | Zhang Qi Wang Xiufeng |
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| Institution: | Zhang Qi Wang Xiufeng(Capital University of Economics , Business,Beijing,P.R.100070) |
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| Abstract: | The doctors' behavior can decide to a large degree the medical consumption level of patients.Doctors have an advantage on this point due to information dissymmetry,which easily causes moral risks.The main reason for distortion of doctors' behavior is doctors' inducing patients to consume,patients lacking in control on doctors' behavior,and paying method having insufficient binding on doctors.To control doctors' diagnosis behavior,the mechanism of doctors' reputation,long-term cooperation between doctors and... |
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| Keywords: | Information Dissymmetry doctor's vocational behavior stimulation and binding |
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