Semiparametric estimation and testing in a model of environmental regulation with adverse selection

We consider a principal–agent model of environmental regulation with adverse selection, where firms are regulated through contracts. We show how the model allows to recover information on structural cost parameters. We use a semiparametric method to estimate consistently such parameters without specifying the distribution of the agents private information. We also show how to check for the specification of the econometric model, as well as auxiliary parametric assumptions, by means of specification tests based on nonparametric estimation. Results are used to discuss a selection of economic issues related to environmental regulation.First version received: August 2002/Final version received: November 2003Previous versions of this work were presented at Seminaire INRA-IDEI, Toulouse, the conference on Applications of semiparametric methods for micro-data, Tilburg, and seminars at UC Berkeley, University of Wisconsin–Madison, CREST, and INRA-LEA. We are indebted to participants, and especially Michael Visser, for their comments. We thank two referees for helpful comments. Financial support from the Conseil Régional Midi-Pyrénées and from INRA is gratefully acknowledged.