Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game |
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Authors: | Timothy N Cason Vai-Lam Mui |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, USA;(2) Department of Economics, Monash University, P.O. Box 11E, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia |
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Abstract: | This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication
among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary
to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended
resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that
the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25–37 percent depending on whether
communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders
can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Keywords: | Communication Cheap talk Collective resistance Laboratory experiment Social preferences |
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