Bidding off the wall in common value auctions |
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Authors: | Georgia Kosmopoulou |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, Norman, USA. Email: georgiak@ou.edu |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the practice of phantom bidding in common value auctions with asymmetric information. Unlike in private value auctions it is very difficult to profit from phantom bidding even if the auctioneer observes the number of interested bidders. We find that the auctioneer is worse off submitting low bids or mixing between his participation strategies. Phantom bidding can generate higher revenues if a single bidder with a high value estimate is likely to be present at the auction. Systematic observation of an isolated high estimate requires negative correlation across bidders’ information that is atypical in a common value environment. |
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Keywords: | auction phantom bidding asymmetric information D44 |
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