终极控制人机会主义行为监管的博弈分析

运用完全信息静态博弈和演化博弈理论,通过对终极控制人与监管者成本收益函数的合理设计,从三个层次研究双方的博弈关系。完全信息静态博弈分析结果表明:对终极控制人机会主义行为监管,不能片面地重罚终极控制人的机会主义行为和给予终极控制人过多的控制权收益,而是必须综合考虑监督者的监管频率和监管者的监管水平。演化博弈研究结果表明:博弈双方进行演化博弈时在三种情况下存在演化稳定策略,终极控制人行动的净成本、市场环境、终极控制人控制权与现金流权的分离程度、股权比例,都显著影响到终极控制人的策略选择。

Game Analysis for Ultimate Controlling Shareholders'opportunistic Behavior Supervising

In this paper,through the ultimate controlling shareholder and regulator rational design of cost-benefit function,using complete information static game and evolutionary game theory,we have a study on relations between the two sides of the game from the three levels.Complete information static game analyses show that not one-sided heavy penalties for opportunistic behavior and too many control benefits but the frequency of supervision and regulatory capacity must be taken into account in order to effectively supervise the ultimate controlling shareholders′ opportunistic behavior.Evolutionary game analyses show that :When the two sides have a evolutionary game,there are three evolutionary stable strategies.The results also show that the operation net cost of ultimate controlling shareholder,market environment,the degree of separation between cash flow rights and control rights,and equity ratio significantly affect the ultimate control strategy selection.