Do stock markets discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just monitoring,or also influencing? |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellon, Spain;2. Department of Economis and Social Sciences, Universitá Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona, Italy;3. Ministry of Economics and Finance, Italy;4. Universitat Jaume I, Castellon, Spain |
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Abstract: | This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher (semi-)volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market influencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect influencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, retail or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization. |
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Keywords: | Market discipline Influencing Partial adjustment Opaqueness Bank risk |
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