首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

风险投资中道德风险的信息化处理方案
引用本文:张凯. 风险投资中道德风险的信息化处理方案[J]. 华东经济管理, 2005, 19(1): 38-40
作者姓名:张凯
作者单位:四川电子科技大学,管理学院,四川,成都,610054;四川电子科技大学,管理学院,四川,成都,610054
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(79900022&70372032)
摘    要:风险投资是一种新兴的、迅速发展并有巨大增长潜力的企业,尤其是高科技企业,提供股权投资以获取高资本收益的投资行为。正如我国其它类型的企业一样,在风险资本运行的过程中,也会产生明显的委托代理关系,从而对高科技企业的治理结构及其治理机制安排产生影响。以往和现在的许多文献都是从契约的角度来降低由于信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险。本文从信息化的角度对风险投资的委托代理关系做一些探讨。

关 键 词:风险投资  信息不对称  模式
文章编号:1007-5097(2005)01-0038-03
收稿时间:2004-09-15
修稿时间:2004-09-15

The Resolution of Moral Hazard with an Informationized Methodin Venture Capital
ZHANG Kai,HAN Yi. The Resolution of Moral Hazard with an Informationized Methodin Venture Capital[J]. East China Economic Management, 2005, 19(1): 38-40
Authors:ZHANG Kai  HAN Yi
Affiliation:Management School,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054,China)
Abstract:Venture capital is an investment behavior that through investing in such enterprises that are rising quickly and have potentiality to develop, especially in high-tech enterprises, investors are offered right of stocks to gain high profits. Just as other types of enterprises, there is the principal-agent relation in the operation process of venture capital, and it has an effect on the arrangement of governance structure and governance mechanism in enterprises. The study of many previous literatures is that they focus on decreasing adverse selection and moral hazard due to information asymmetry from the angle of contract. This paper probes into principal-agent relation in venture capital from the informationized angle.
Keywords:venture capital  information asymmetry  model
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《华东经济管理》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《华东经济管理》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号