The testable implications of zero-sum games |
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Authors: | SangMok Lee |
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Institution: | Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91125, United States |
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Abstract: | We study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. We characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. We prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games. |
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Keywords: | Interchangeability Nash-rationalizability Revealed preference Zero-sum game |
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