The desegregating effect of school tracking |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Nottingham, Nottingham School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK;2. Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Via Columbia 2, I-00133 Rome, Italy;3. CEPR, 90-98 Goswell Street, London EC1V 7DB, UK;4. Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Astley Clarke Building, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK;5. Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain;6. CREIP, Spain;1. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, United States;2. U.S. Census Bureau, United States;3. University of Alabama, United States;1. Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK;2. Cardiff Metropolitan University, Western Ave., Cardiff CF5 2YB, UK;1. Division of Genetic Epidemiology, Department of Medical Genetics, Molecular and Clinical Pharmacology, Medical University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria;2. Division of Human Genetics, Department of Medical Genetics, Molecular and Clinical Pharmacology, Medical University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria;3. Department of Chemical Pathology, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa;4. Department of Clinical Biochemistry, Christian Medical College Vellore, Tamil Nadu, India;5. Department of Biochemistry, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, India;6. Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Faculty of Medicine, Siriraj Hospital, Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand;7. Division of Clinical Biochemistry, Queen Mary Hospital, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China;8. Graduate School of Pharmaceutical Medicine, International University of Health and Welfare, Fukuoka, Japan;9. Max-Planck-Institute for Ornithology, Andechs, Germany;10. Centre de Recherches Médicales de Lambaréné, Albert Schweitzer Hospital, Lambaréné, Gabon;11. Department for Tropical Medicine, Eberhard-Karls-University Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany |
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| Abstract: | This paper makes the following point: “detracking” schools, that is preventing them from allocating students to classes according to their ability, may lead to an increase in income residential segregation. It does so in a simple model where households care about the school peer group of their children. If ability and income are positively correlated, tracking implies that some high income households face the choice of either living in the areas where most of the other high income households live and having their child assigned to the low track, or instead living in lower income neighbourhoods where their child would be in the high track. Under mild conditions, tracking leads to an equilibrium with partial income desegregation where perfect income segregation would be the only stable outcome without tracking. |
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| Keywords: | Tracking School selection Income segregation School choice Tiebout |
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