转移价格的供应链激励机制与道德风险问题研究

考虑一个由制造商与分销商组成的供应链,制造商通过广告投入拉动产品销售,分销商通过促销活动推动产品销售。如果用一个制造商和两个分销商构成的供应链模型,来研究供应链中的博弈关系、激励机制和道德风险问题。只有给出两分销商的Nash均衡结果以及制造商与两分销商间的Nash均衡结果,才能解决供应链中的激励机制的设计。然后通过支付函数的全微分,来揭示供应链中的道德风险问题,从而证明供应链内部存在囚徒困境现象。

Incentive Mechanism Based on Transfer Price and Moral Hazard in Supply Chain

The supply chain involving manufacturer and retailer is formalized,in which one manufacturer and two distributors promote sale by advertisement.The paper models this supply chain and studies the game relationship,incentive mechanism and moral hazard in it.By characterizing Nash equilibrium of distributor,manufacturer and retailer.It solves the incentive mechanism design of supply chain.Through function's differential,it finds the moral hazard between manufacturer and retailer,which proves the existence of Prisoners Dilemma it finds the supply chain.