The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results |
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Authors: | Yair Tauman Naoki Watanabe |
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Affiliation: | (1) The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel;(2) Department of Economics, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA;(3) Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan |
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Abstract: | We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003. |
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Keywords: | Patent licensing Max– min and Min– max Shapley value |
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