Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings |
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| Authors: | Burkhard Hehenkamp Cheng-Zhong Qin Charles Stuart |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, D-44221 Dortmund, Germany (e-mail: mik-buhe@wiso.uni-dortmund.de), DE;(2) Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA (e-mail: qin@econ.ucsb.edu; stuart@econ.ucsb.edu), US |
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| Abstract: | We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | : Oligopoly Bertrand equilibrium Cournot equilibrium Natural selection Evolutionary games |
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