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Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions
Authors:Sylvain Bourjade  
Institution:aToulouse Business School, 20 Boulevard Lascrosses, 31068 Toulouse, France
Abstract:I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called “collusive-seeming” equilibria disappear.
Keywords:Uniform price auctions  Rationing  Uncertainty  Initial public offerings
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