The Thai Rural Credit System: Public Subsidies, Private Information, and Segmented Markets |
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Authors: | Siamwalla, Ammar Pinthong, Chirmsak Poapongsakorn, Nipon Satsanguan, Ploenpit Nettayarak, Prayong Mingmaneenakin, Wanrak Tubpun, Yuavares |
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Affiliation: | Ammar Siamwalla is president, Thailand Development Research Institute The other authors are members of the economics faculty at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand |
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Abstract: | Thailand has sought to increase farmers' access to credit bygovernment intervention. In 1966 it created a government agriculturalbank to lend solely to farm households, and beginning in thelate 1970s it required commercial banks to lend heavily in therural sector, either directly or by making deposits in the agriculturalbank. The result was an enormous expansion of credit in therural sector. But because formal lenders were either unableor unwilling to solve the information problems involved in thebroad range of rural credit transactions, the informal creditsector (which charged interest rates many times higher thanthe formal sector) continued to thrive. Using household surveysand surveys of moneylenders, this article provides a detailedanalysis of the ways in which lenders in the informal sectorhave solved the information problems of providing credit. Theauthors argue that the informal sector is competitive, and thathigh interest rates reflect high information costs, not thescarcity of funds. |
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