Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods |
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Authors: | William C Wheaton |
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Institution: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one. |
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