Recognition versus Disclosure of Stock Option Compensation: An Analysis of Judgements and Decisions of Nonprofessional Investors*/CONSTATER OU PRÉSENTER PAR VOIE DE NOTE LA RÉMUNÉRATION SOUS FORME D'OPTIONS D'ACHAT D'ACTIONS: UNE ANALYSE DES JUGEMENTS ET DES DÉCISIONS DES INVESTISSEURS NON PROFESSIONNELS

Given the importance of stock options in the aggregate compensation of chief executive officers and other firm employees in the 1990s and early 2000s, the International Accounting Standards Board issued an International Financial Reporting Standard on stock‐based payments on February 19, 2004, requiring that all share‐based payment transactions be recognized at fair value in entities' financial statements. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Accounting Standards Board had already agreed to this principle and amended section 3870 of the CICA Handbook (stock‐based compensation) for financial periods beginning on or after January 1, 2004, making Canada the first major jurisdiction to require all public companies to expense employee stock‐based compensation awards. The revised section eliminated the possibility of disclosing pro forma net income and earnings per share only by way of a note. This research, conducted as a between‐subjects experiment with executive MBA students as nonprofessional investors, examines whether changes in the way stock option compensation is reported (recognition as an expense in the income statement or note disclosure of pro forma net income and earnings per share) affect financial statement users' judgements and investment decisions. Our results indicate that, consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, the reporting method does indeed significantly influence subjects' judgement of the expected stock price direction, but has no material influence on their investment decisions.