绿色施工过程中有效预防施工方与监理方合谋行为的博弈分析

当前的工程建设中施工企业对绿色施工的重视程度较低,在绿色施工中仍存在很多的问题。由于既得利益的驱使,我国的某些绿色施工项目中仍存在有施工企业与施工监理人员的合谋行为。为了改善这种状况,运用博弈论理论和方法对如何预防这种合谋行为进行了分析,通过建立混合策略博弈模型,分析出政府核查力度对合谋行为影响,以及政府惩罚力度与合谋行为发生的关系,并以此制定防范机制,进行规范管理,以期达到促进绿色施工健康快速发展的目的。

Analysis on Prevention of Collusive Behavior in Green Construction with Game Theory

In construction, construction enterprise takes no account of green construction. And there are still a lot of problems in green construction. Due to the drive from the vested interests, there are still collusive behavior between construction enterprise and supervisor. In order to improve the situation, the paper analyzes the prevention of collusive behavior by using game theory and method. It establishes a mixed strategy game model, analyzes the influence of verification on collusive behavior, and the relationship between penalties and collusive behavior, and in this way develop preventive mechanisms, standard management, with a view to achieve the purpose of promoting the healthy development of green construction.