Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game |
| |
| Authors: | C A Pensavalle G Pieri |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Mathematics and Physics, University of Sassari, Via Vienna 2, 07100, Sassari, Italy
2. Department of Architectural Science, University of Genova, Stradone S. Agostino 37, 16123, Genova, Italy
|
| |
| Abstract: | In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
