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Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility
Abstract: Research Summary: This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) improves firms’ competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts. To obtain exogenous variation in firms’ social engagement, I exploit a quasi‐natural experiment provided by the enactment of state‐level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions. Using constituency statutes as instrumental variable (IV) for CSR, I find that companies with higher CSR receive more procurement contracts. The effect is stronger for more complex contracts and in the early years of the government‐company relationship, suggesting that CSR helps mitigate information asymmetries by signaling trustworthiness. Moreover, the effect is stronger in competitive industries, indicating that CSR can serve as a differentiation strategy to compete against other bidders. Managerial Summary: This study examines how companies can strategically improve their competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts—a market of economic importance (15–20% of GDP). It shows that companies with higher social and environmental performance (CSR) receive more procurement contracts. This effect is stronger for more complex contracts, in the early years of the government–company relationship, and in more competitive industries. These findings indicate that firms’ CSR can serve as a signaling and differentiation strategy that influences the purchasing decision of government agencies. Accordingly, managers operating in the business‐to‐government (B2G) sector could benefit from integrating social and environmental considerations into their strategic decision making.
Keywords:corporate social responsibility  government procurement contracts  information asymmetry  non‐market strategy  trust
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