An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games |
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| Authors: | Marc Chamberland Ross Cressman |
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| Affiliation: | a Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, 50112;b Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5, Canada |
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| Abstract: | An example is developed to show that equilibrium selection via dynamic stability, when applied to the normal form of extensive form games, is inconsistent with the subgame structure. Alternative dynamic approaches are proposed and discussed to circumvent this inconsistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. |
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| Keywords: | evolutionary games dynamic stability extensive form |
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